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Unlearning Counterinsurgency*
Dr. Steven Metz
Strategic Studies Institute
Once again insurgency and counterinsurgency have become issues of great
importance to the U.S. military, particularly the Army. This is not a new
phenomenon, but the latest manifestation of an old cycle. Several times in the
past the Army has mastered counterinsurgency, only to see attention wane when
the strategic significance of insurgency subsided, thus forcing it to re-learn the
skill when a new threat emerged. Now we must do this again.
Today, insurgency has returned as a major strategic issue for the United
States. In today's global security environment, sustained, large-scale conventional war between states is unlikely, at least in the short term. But the
conditions that generate internal conflict―discontent arising from globalization,
the failure of economic development to keep pace with expectations; the collapse
of traditional political, economic, and social orders; widespread anger and
resentment; environmental decay; population pressure; the pervasiveness of
weak regimes; the growth of transnational organized crime; and, the widespread
availability of arms―persist. As a result, insurgency has become both common
and strategically significant.
This poses a direct threat to American security. In today's world, stability
within states affects others. Interconnectedness, the permeability of states, the
globalization of economies, the transparency arising from information
technology, and the intermixing of people around the world give every conflict
wider repercussions. Internal conflicts create refugee flows which destabilize
neighboring states. They often spawn organized crime, as rebels turn to
smuggling to raise capital and acquire weaponry. As the images of internal war
are broadcast or emailed around the world, awareness rises and, with it,
demands for action or intervention. And internal conflicts and the weak states or
areas outside government control which they create often serve as breeding
grounds for terrorism.
Insurgency is difficult for the United States because of the protracted and
ambiguous nature of the conflict. Rapid decisive operations―an American
forte―seldom work. Long-term involvement with extensive interagency activity
and partner cooperation is the norm. Since the military battlespace is not
decisive, ultimate success requires that the U.S. military play a supporting role to
other government agencies and, more importantly, to the partner governments
and their security forces. Unfortunately, the U.S. national security organization
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is not optimized for counterinsurgency support. Even though the military often
is effective at the combat component of counterinsurgency, other government
agencies are less so in the political, economic, psychological, and intelligence
realms. But because insurgency is a holistic threat, counterinsurgency must be
integrated and holistic. Ultimately, a nation is only as good at counterinsurgency
support as its weakest link, not its strongest.
The American military, the Department of Defense, and other government
agencies thus are grappling with the renewed insurgency threat. They are
developing strategies, operational concepts, and new doctrine. Insurgency and
counterinsurgency are being integrated into the curriculum of the military
professional educational system, Joint and Service wargames, and training
programs. Luckily, a foundation of expertise is available. While few of the
Army's junior leaders have studied insurgency in depth, many uniformed and
civilian senior leaders as well as supporting contractors and other civilian
employees have experience gained in Vietnam, El Salvador, or some other
counterinsurgency theater. This is both a blessing and curse.
Because Vietnam was such a seminal event in American history and in the
lives of those who lead and shape the Army, the tendency is to extrapolate
general conclusions of insurgency from that conflict. In doctrine and other forms
of official thinking, the organization, strategy, and methods of the Viet Cong and
their North Vietnamese allies are treated as if they compose a general model of
all insurgencies. For instance, characteristics of the Vietnamese insurgency―that
it sought the revolutionary seizure of power, that it was built on a revolutionary
cadre and an extensive political underground movement, that it combined semiconventional military activities with guerrilla war and terrorism―are viewed as
if they are features of all insurgencies.
In reality, the Vietnamese insurgency was specific, shaped by its particular
historical, political, and cultural context. Some elements of it are common to all
insurgencies, others are not. Insurgency is mutating. Modern insurgents tend to
adopt looser, networked structures rather than hierarchical ones. Because they
cannot count on state sponsors, they undertake criminal activity or ally
themselves with global organized crime. The form of available sanctuary, the
nature of allies and partners, and the ideological framework of insurgency all are
changing.
It is not yet clear which of these mutations are most important. Much does
remain constant―insurgency remains complex, grinding, dirty, and violent,
mired in multiple levels of ambiguity and dragged out for an extended period of
time. But we cannot simply dust off our 20th century notion and apply it to 21st
century insurgency. We must, in part, unlearn what we know. With the opening
of the mind that this provides, our strategic thinkers can counter the new forms
of this old challenge.
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